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Abstract
Biogas plants are a specific facility from the QRA (Quantitative Risk Assessment) methodologies' point of view, especially in the case 
of the determination of the event frequency of accident scenarios for biogas leakage from a gas holder and subsequent initiation. 
QRA methodologies determine event frequencies for different types of accident events related to vessels made of steel. Gas holders 
installed at biogas plants are predominantly made of other materials and are often integrated with the fermenter. It is therefore a 
specific type of gas holder, differing from that which is commonly used in the chemical industry. In addition, long-term experience is 
not available for the operation of biogas plants, unlike in the chemical industry. The event frequencies listed in the QRA methodologies 
are not relevant for the risk assessment of biogas plants. This work is focused on setting the prerequisites for QRA of biogas storage, 
including for example: information on hazardous chemical substances occurring at biogas plants, their classification, and information 
on the construction of integrated gas holders. For the purpose of the work, a scenario was applied where the greatest damage 
(to life or property) is expected. This scenario is the leakage of the total volume of hazardous gas substance from the gas holder 
and subsequent initiation. Based on this information, a "tree" was processed for "Fault Tree Analysis" (FTA), and frequencies were 
estimated for each event. Thereafter, an "Event Tree Analysis" was carried out. This work follows up on a discussion by experts on the 
determination of scenario frequencies for biogas plants that was conducted in the past.
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1 Introduction
Biogas plants are technologies where potentially hazardous 
substances are produced or stored. The major hazardous 
substance is biogas with the main hazardous property being 
its flammability. Under EU Directive No. 2012/18/EU, in 
Europe most facilities have a below-limit quantity of haz-
ardous substances. Facilities with an over-limit quantity of 
hazardous substances are the exception. An example is the 
NAWARO BioEnergie Park in Güstrow, where cogenera-
tion units with a total output of 20 MWel [1] are located. 
There an excessive amount of hazardous substance (bio-
gas) can be expected. In this case, the biogas consumption 
with a methane content of 50-55 %vol is approximately 
9 600 – 10 000 m3 per hour.
For the purpose of quantitative risk analysis (QRA), 
it is necessary to have a knowledge of the frequencies of 
events of accident scenarios. These frequencies of events 
are possible to determine based on recognized methodol-
ogies for QRA in the chemical industry, such as Dutch 
CPR 18 or methodology by HSE (UK Health and Safety 
Executive). Unfortunately, these methodologies do not 
consider construction materials other than steel. However, 
some important elements of biogas plants are often made 
from different materials. For example, the gas holder is 
made from EPDM material. 
The research of professional works has shown that dis-
cussion on this topic is very limited in professional circles. 
The work by Heezen et al. [2] is an exception. This work 
states that the National Institute for Public Health and the 
Environment (RIVM) has proposed that companies that 
process safety documentation for a biogas plant falling 
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under the SEVESO Directive should consider the fermen-
ter (including the integrated gas holder) as an atmospheric 
vessel. However, they also state that further research is 
needed to confirm whether this approach is valid or not. 
The frequency of an event is generally determined as 
the frequency of accidental events divided by the number 
of operated facilities and their operating times. However, 
this cannot be used for cases where the frequency is very 
low, or for cases that have not occurred at all. This is also 
the case of biogas plant accidents. Two basic approaches 
can be used to determine the frequency of an event. 
The first is Probabilistic Risk Analysis using Fault Tree 
Analysis (FTA) and Event Tree Analysis (ETA). Another 
method is to use what are called ‘precursors’ together with 
Bayesian statistics. However, Bayesian statistics can also 
be used in Probabilistic Risk Analysis [3]. The following 
works are worth mentioning, dealing with the possibili-
ties, limitations, advantages and disadvantages of both 
approaches [4-8, 12].
The purpose of this work is to determine an estimate 
of frequency of a representative accident scenario at bio-
gas station, which is consistent with QRA methodologies. 
Representative accident scenario is following: the leakage 
of the entire volume of substance from the integrated gas 
holder and subsequent initiation. The paper so follows up 
on the work by Heezen et al. [2]. 
2 Methods
The Fault Tree Analysis (FTA) method was used to deter-
mine the top event frequency estimation. The top event 
was determined in accordance with the CPR 18 methodol-
ogy. It is an event in which all hazardous substances have 
leaked. The available Health and Safety Executive (HSE) 
databases [9] and specialized work [10] were used to deter-
mine the frequency of sub-events representing the tree. 
The Tecnica Empirica Stima Errori Operatori (TESEO) 
method was used for Human Reliability Assessment 
(HRA). The frequency of a representative accident sce-
nario was determined using Event Tree Analysis (ETA). 
Some value of the frequency of event was estimated 
based on information from the authors’ accident data-
base. This database records accidents in the timeframe 
from 2006 to 2017 and contains 241 items. The database 
contains information about property loss, health damage, 
locality of accident, causes and consequences of accidents. 
The database includes accidents in Germany, the Czech 
Republic, Austria, Lithuania, Switzerland, Great Britain, 
France, Italy and Luxembourg. Information on accidents 
originates from public databases, such as ARIA [11], 
eMARS [12], ZEMA [13], as well as from newspaper arti-
cles. The outputs from the database are presented in the 
authors’ work [14].
The probabilities were taken over from the Reference 
Manual Bevi Risk Assessments [15] for ETA.
3 Results
3.1 Hazardous chemical substances at biogas plants
The standard procedure for risk analysis, defined by EC 
Regulation No. 1272/2008, is the determination of hazard-
ous properties and quantities of chemicals stored or pro-
cessed in the facility. 
The type and quantity of chemicals occurring in an 
object depends on many circumstances, such as the type 
of biogas plant technology, and the presence of other haz-
ardous substances. These hazardous substances may not 
be related directly to the operations of a biogas plant, but 
must be included in the risk analysis. Fertilizers or fuel 
for agricultural machinery can be included among these 
substances.
The chemical substances occurring most frequently in 
a facility in direct connection with the operation of the 
biogas plant are the following:
• Biogas,
•  Engine oil in cogeneration units,
•  Refrigerant in refrigeration unit (to reduce biogas 
moisture),
•  Anti-freeze mixture in heating circuits,
•  The content of fermenters and tanks for storage of 
fermentation residues.
Of these substances, only biogas is a hazardous mixture 
according to Regulation (EC) No 1272/2008. Its hazard-
ous property is primarily flammability or, in the case of a 
higher concentration of hydrogen sulphide, toxicity.
3.2 Top event
The largest quantity of biogas is located in the gas 
holder. The biogas is located in one or more gas holders, 
depending on the power of the cogeneration unit. Two 
gas holders with a volume of approximately 1 200 m3 
and at overpressure of up to 5 kPa can be presupposed 
for a total power of 1 MW. On the basis of standard 
CPR 18, several accident events can be assumed. 
Events may be the following: loss of gas holder integ-
rity and release of biogas into the atmosphere; full 
bore rupture of a pipe and the release of biogas into the 
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atmosphere, etc. The event of the loss of gas holder integ-
rity is selected for the purpose of this paper. This is an 
event which has the greatest potential to cause damage. 
The paper is focused on an integrated gas holder, because 
it is the most common type of biogas holder.
3.3 Technical solutions of integrated gas holder
For a better understanding of the function of gas holders, it 
is advisable to know their design. The most common tech-
nical solution of biogas plants is an integrated gas holder, 
where the gas holder is part of the fermenter. The gas 
holder is attached to the concrete or steel construction of 
the fermenter. Membrane mount systems differ, depend-
ing on the company supplying the technology.
Fig. 1 shows the attachment detail of a single- layer gas 
holder, which is made of EPDM membrane. A trapezoidal 
steel profile is inserted into the reinforced concrete head of 
the fermenter. Inside this profile, a rubber hose is inserted. 
The membrane is wound around the rubber hose. The rub-
ber hose is connected to an automatic air pressure plant. 
During an increase of pressure in the hose, the membrane 
is pressed against the side wall of the steel profile to create 
a lock which hermetically separates the biogas in the gas 
holder from the ambient atmosphere.
This system is particularly advantageous in view of the 
short time consumed in membrane replacement. In the 
fermenter, there is a wooden floor on the surface that pre-
vents the membrane from falling into the fermented mate-
rial. At the same time, the wooden floor offers plenty of 
space for bacteria- oxidizing hydrogen sulphide.
Fig. 2 shows the attachment system of an integrated gas 
holder consisting of two membranes. Both membranes are 
placed over the edge of the reinforced concrete fermen-
ter construction. These membranes are secured by steel 
plates, which are screwed into the fermenter head around 
the periphery of the fermenter. Air of a defined pressure is 
blown into the space between the membranes. The shape 
of the outer membrane thus remains preserved and does 
not depend on the amount of stored biogas. The shape of 
the inner membrane varies according to the gas holder 
filling level. Support belts are inside the fermenter. Belts 
prevent the internal membrane from falling into the fer-
mented material.
Fig. 3 shows the last fixing system which is commonly 
used. It is a single-layer integrated gas holder. The mem-
brane is positioned over the edge of the reinforced con-
crete construction of the fermenter. The hermetic closure 
of the gas holder occurs by stretching the membrane by 
means of tensioners. As in the previous case, the fall of the 
membrane into the fermented material is prevented by the 
support belts within the fermenter.
3.4 Fault Tree Analysis
Table 1 lists individual types of events that may result 
in massive gas leakage from the integrated gas holder. 
Frequency or probability are assigned to these events. The 
“tree” is assembled for FTA purposes in Fig. 4. The Fault 
Tree Analysis method was applied to the fixing system of 
Type A. This is the most commonly used fixing system in 
the Czech Republic. The resulting top event frequency is 
f = 1.6 x 10-2 y-1 which is evident from Table 1.
Fig. 1 System A - Attachment detail of an integrated gas holder to the 
reinforced concrete structure of the fermenter
Fig. 2 System B – Attachment detail of an integrated gas holder to the 
reinforced concrete structure of the fermenter
Fig. 3 System C – Attachment detail of an integrated gas holder to the 
reinforced concrete structure of the fermenter
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3.5 Determination of a representative accident scenario 
and its estimation of probability
The representative accident scenario – a massive leakage 
of biogas from the gas holder (caused by extreme weather 
conditions, mechanical damage, lightning impact, etc.) 
and subsequent initiation – was considered for the pur-
pose of the scenario probability estimation.
Event Tree Analysis (ETA) was used for this purpose. 
The results for one fermenter are given in Fig. 5.
4 Discussion
4.1 Classification of hazardous substance
Biogas is only considered to be ‘flammable’ for the pur-
pose of this work. However, biogas can also be considered 
as a ‘toxic’ gas due to the presence of H
2
S. 
EC Regulation No. 1272/2008, Annex I lists the general 
limit of 0.1 % by volume for toxic substances in categories 
1, 2, 3. Heezen et al. [2] explain further interpretations of 
EC Regulation No. 1272/2008, where biogas with an H
2
S 
concentration of less than 2.2 % (22,000 ppm) by volume 
does not need to be classified as toxic.
High concentrations of H
2
S in biogas are undesirable 
in terms of the reliable operation of biogas plant technolo-
gies. For that reason, operators are keen to keep H
2
S val-
ues as low as possible. According to other sources, H
2
S 
concentrations can vary greatly during anaerobic fermen-
tation. For example, at a biogas plant in the Rhineland, 
Germany, H
2
S concentrations fluctuated between 200 
ppm and 1 000 ppm during the year [16]. Also personal 
communication with biogas plant operators in the Czech 
Republic confirmed that their H
2
S concentration in bio-
gas is below 1 000 ppm. However, the H
2
S concentration 
in biogas is fundamentally dependent on the composition 
of the biogas plant feedstock. Our survey shows that bio-
gas produced from a plant biomass, livestock manure and 
sewage sludge, contains H
2
S in the range of 0.01-0.08 % 
(100-800 ppm) by volume. By contrast, biogas produced 
from waste from the food and paper industries can reach 
significantly higher H
2
S concentrations, 0.6-1.5 % (6 000-
15 000 ppm). Nevertheless, the number of these facilities 
are in the significant minority. In connection with toxicity, 
the escaping gas cannot be underestimated. Some expert 
publications state that H
2
S concentrations of 1 000-2 000 
ppm or higher, can cause the collapse of the organism to 
occur in seconds. At these concentrations, respiratory 
centres fail and there is respiratory arrest. There is the 
possible risk of mortality within a few minutes [17].
In terms of EC Regulation No. 1272/2008, in most cases, 
the only hazardous property of biogas is ‘flammability’.
Fig. 5 Event Tree Analysis for massive instantaneous release of biogas
Table 1 The estimation of the top event frequency
Event
[y-1]
Frequency Probability
Ref.*
[-]
C1 Material Defect - 0.1
C2 Human Error - 1 x 10-3
C3 Strong Wind 0.15
C4 Pump Failure 5 x 10-4 [9]
C5
Pressure Circuit 
Failure 1.6 x 10
-6 [9]
C6
Pressure 
Transducer 
Failure
4.7 x 10-3 [10]
B1 Pressure Drop 2.4 x 10-6
A1
The Loss of 
Integrity 3.02 x 10
-4
A2 Lightning 1.5 x 10-4
A3 
Sabotage 1.0 x 10-3
Top Event 1.6 x 10-2
* Values where the source is not listed have been estimated on the 
basis of expert work or calculated (see Section 4, Discussion).
Fig. 4 Fault Tree Analysis for a massive leakage of biogas
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4.2 The determination of event frequency according to 
recognised methods for the chemical industry
The Dutch CPR 18 [18] method and British HSE [9] are 
recognised methods for quantitative risk assessment. 
These methods are among the most commonly used meth-
ods for quantitative risk assessment in the chemical indus-
try in Europe. However, some problems appear in the 
quantitative risk assessment of similar technology, such 
as biogas plants. 
The recognised Dutch CPR 18 method sets accident 
events and their frequencies in general for atmospheric 
and pressure vessels (including pressure vessels, pro-
cess vessels, and reactors). However, these are made of 
steel. The frequency of events reported by the British 
HSE [9] applies to atmospheric vessels, refrigerated ves-
sels, pressure vessels and chemical reactors. The question 
is whether biogas holders are considered as atmospheric, 
pressurised vessels, or as reactors.
We will consider the most commonly installed type of 
gas holder in biogas plants. This is the integrated gas holder 
with a maximum overpressure of 5 kPa. The limit of over-
pressure when a vessel is considered as pressurised differs 
in different regulations. For example, OSHA defines the 
atmospheric tank as a storage tank that has been designed to 
operate at atmospheric pressure through 0.5 psig (11.5 kPa 
gauge) [19]. According to the American Institute of Chemical 
Engineers, the atmospheric storage tank as a storage tank is 
designed to operate at any pressure between ambient pres-
sure and 0.5 psig (11.5 kPa gauge) [20]. European Parliament 
Directive 2014/68/ EU focuses on pressure vessels with 
overpressure exceeding 0.5 bar (50 kPa). It also states that: 
“pressure equipment exposed to a pressure not exceeding 
0.5 bar does not pose a significant risk from pressure” [21]. 
The American Society of Mechanical Engineers (ASME) 
states the overpressure limit of 15 psig (100 kPa). The Czech 
Technical Standard ČSN 69 0010-2-1 lists the limit 
70 kPa for pressure vessels. Below this limit value, vessels 
are classified as atmospheric. According to the above data, 
it is clear that values vary considerably among individual 
countries and industrial sectors.
Heezen et al. [2] propose fermenters to be considered 
as atmospheric vessels. Furthermore, the CPR 18 method-
ology defines process vessels and reactors. Methodology 
CPR18 states: “In a process vessel, a change in the phys-
ical properties of the substance occurs, e.g. tempera-
ture or phase. Examples of process vessels are distilla-
tion columns, condensers and filters. Vessels where only 
the level of liquid changes can be considered as pressure 
vessels.” [18]. If we consider the integrated gas holder 
and the fermenter as a whole, the gas holder could also be 
defined as a process vessel or reactor. The usage of exist-
ing methodologies is questionable for determining the fre-
quency of events for individual accident events.
4.3 Fault Tree Analysis
The top event frequency is f = 1.6 x 10-2. From the Table 1, 
it is evident that events C1, C2 and C3 play the dominant 
role in the calculation of top event frequency. Therefore, it 
can be deduced that other fixing systems have similar val-
ues of top event frequencies. The procedure for the deter-
mination of event frequency values is as follows.
Level C1 represents the release of the membrane due to 
a defect of the material (in conjunction with a strong wind). 
As noted above, the gas holder membranes are made of 
rubber-based materials (EPDM). Sufficient data have not 
been found to determine the event frequency of membrane 
loss integrity due to strong wind. These are often hid-
den defects, which occur only after the material has been 
exposed to higher pressures from wind gusts. The usage of 
this material (from which the integrated gas holder is made) 
is non-standard in the chemical industry. Over time, the 
physical properties of used materials also change as they 
age. Changes in individual properties depend on many fac-
tors, such as the intensity of sunlight, temperature, or rain 
acidity [22]. The results of tests for changes in the physical 
properties of EPDM materials used for roof applications 
are evident in some papers [22-25]. Paper [25] states that 
the loss of membrane tightness at 25 °C results after about 
87 years of operation. However, the gas holder is exposed 
to higher temperatures during operation. This temperature 
can exceed 50 °C under Central European conditions. The 
membrane is exposed to low-cycle stress as well. Changing 
atmospheric conditions (wind, rain, frost) also have a sig-
nificant influence on material properties. All these factors 
can cause the reduction of material lifetime. The stiffness 
of rubber is the next important property which is influ-
enced by temperature. The stiffness of rubber increases 
with an increase in temperature. The authors in paper [24] 
state the results of the compression set of EPDM compo-
nents for a refrigeration system. From the results, it is evi-
dent that there is 20  % degradation during 820 hours of 
material at a temperature of 30 °C. 
Based on this information, it is supposed that the loss 
of membrane integrity results after 40 years of installa-
tion operation with a 99  % probability. If it is considered 
that the lifetime of the material is given by exponential 
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distribution, the average lifetime of the material is 
8.7 years. On the basis of this distribution, the probability 
of loss of membrane integrity after 1 year of operation, 
i.e. p = 0.1 can be estimated. 
A simple TESEO (Tecnica Empirica Stima Errori 
Operatori) screening method was used for the esti-
mation of the probability of human error at Level C2. 
This method is commonly used in Human Reliability 
Assessment (HRA). The following values K1 = 0.01, 
K2 = 0.1, K3 = 1, K4 = 1, K5 = 1 were assigned to each fac-
tor. The resulting probability value is p = 1 x 10-3. 
The human error during fixing of the integrated gas 
holder can related to the rapid gusts of wind. From the 
authors’ database of biogas plant accidents, it is evident that 
biogas leakage from a gas holder related to strong wind has 
occurred in the past. There were a total of four cases in 2017 
and two cases in 2016, when the membrane was released 
and biogas leaked into the atmosphere. All events from 
2017 occurred in Germany. Two cases occurred in the days 
when the area was affected by orcans (Thomas, Herwart) 
and two cases on days when the area was hit by strong wind 
gusts of up to 125 km per hour. However, it can be assumed 
that these extraordinary situations have occurred more 
times. For example, Santella et al. [26] state that hurricanes 
in the US territory cause an average of 5.6 leaks of different 
ranges of hazardous chemicals per 100 facilities (hurricanes 
of category 1-2 according to the Safir-Simpson scale); in the 
case of category 3 hurricanes, it is 18.2 leaks per 100 facil-
ities. In addition, the author Moreno [27], without further 
details, reported that during the period 1995–2014, there 
were 66 events (whereas the authors’ database has a total of 
19 events of this type) when biogas from biogas technology 
leaked into the atmosphere. Some of these were probably 
influenced by high-speed winds. Between 2007 and 2017, 
the territory of Central and Western Europe was affected 
by a total of 16 hurricanes, thus with wind gusts with the 
potential to damage biogas plants. The frequency of hurri-
canes in this territory is f = 1.45 y-1. However, hurricanes do 
not strike the entire territory at one time. Hurricanes usu-
ally affect a limited territory and rather at higher altitudes. 
For these reasons, an approximately 10 times lower value 
of frequency is selected, i.e. f = 0.15 y-1. This value was also 
assigned to Level C3. In the future, the number of extraordi-
nary events of this type can be expected to increase.
Event values that are represented by Levels C4 (com-
pressor failure) and C5 (mechanical pressure circuit dam-
age) were taken from the HSE risk assessment methodol-
ogy [9]. The frequency of failure of the pressure sensor f 
= 5.4 x 10-7 per hour was taken from the literature source 
[10]. It is conservatively assumed that the pressure sensor 
is operating continuously throughout the year. In this case, 
the event frequency C6 is  f = 4.7 x 10-3 y-1.
The lightning strike frequency with consequential dam-
age was calculated according to the HSE methodology. 
According to the methodology, the lightning ground flash 
density in England is 1.0 flash per km2 per year. However, 
lightning ground flash density may vary considerably in 
different parts of Europe. For example, the average value 
for the Czech Republic for the period 2002 – 2008 was 
approximately 3.7 lightning strikes per km2 per year [28]. 
For the purpose of the work, a conservative value of 4.0 
lightning strikes per km2 per year was used. If we consider 
the diameter of the integrated gas holder as about 25 m, the 
total height of the object as 12 m and the conservative value 
of location factor as 1 (no other objects in the area), the 
probability of damage to the protected object by lightning 
is p = 0.02, the resulting frequency for one integrated gas 
holder is f = 1.5 x 10-4 y-1. This value was assigned to Level 
A2. The authors’ database shows that in the years 2006 
–2017, four cases were recorded where lightning strikes 
occurred in biogas plants. In all cases, the lightning struck 
the gas holder. The result was the damaged membrane and 
subsequent ignition of the biogas. 
In the authors’ database [14], two cases of extraordi-
nary situations were recorded that were caused by sabo-
tage. In both cases, the valves closing the fermenters were 
opened, followed by liquid leakage out of the fermenter. 
The reason for the sabotage is unknown. In general, it 
may have been dissatisfied employees, poor interpersonal 
relationships with the owner of the device, or a desire to 
be famous. It is also often shown that public opinion is 
against biogas plant operation. The frequency of sabotage 
is estimated with respect to the above factors.
It should be noted that the gas holder is not the typi-
cal target for a saboteur. A heat source with high thermal 
output is needed for burnout through the membrane [29]. 
The perpetrator would probably attracts attention by this 
act, mainly because most of these attacks take place at 
night. In this situation, it will be easy to track down him. 
Under these assumptions, it would be easier for perpetra-
tors to open the valves on the fermenters and to empty 
them. With respect to the above information, the event fre-
quency is estimated as f = 1 x 10-3 y-1. 
After evaluation of the entire tree in the FTA, it is obvi-
ous that the resulting estimated value of the top event fre-
quency is  f = 1.6 x 10-2 y-1.
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An event that has the potential to cause damage to 
human life, the environment or to cause material dam-
age is significant for evaluation in terms of risk analysis. 
From this point of view, it is a question whether the event 
of “Damage of biogas holder membrane by strong wind” 
should be included in the FTA. In this case, the mixture of 
flammable gas would be diluted rapidly due to the strong 
wind. It can be assumed that a concentration of methane 
would not be formed in the biogas plant to cause ignition 
of the mixture. On the other hand, biological processes 
do not stop after membrane damage by wind. The biogas 
will continue to form with the possibility of the forma-
tion of a flammable mixture. By applying the same pro-
cedure to systems B and C, it is obvious that the event 
of “Compressor failure” cannot be considered. It is given 
by a different fixing system of the membrane. This event 
would be replaced by another event related to fixing sys-
tem failure. However, this fact will not have too signifi-
cant an influence on the value of the top event frequency, 
because top event frequency is significantly influenced by 
the following events: C1 (Material Defect), C2 (Human 
Error), C3 (Strong Wind), which is evident from Table 1.
4.4 The determination of acceptability of a 
representative scenario
Event Tree Analysis shows that the resulting frequency 
of a representative accident scenario is relatively high – 
f = 4.6 x 10-3 y-1 (Explosion) and f = 3.1 x 10-3 y-1 (Flash 
Fire). These values are valid for one fermenter. Two fer-
menters are often located in biogas plants. In this case, the 
values of the resulting event frequencies are doubled. 
Dutch criterion for societal risk [30] is determined by 
the Eq. (1):
F Np =
−
10
3 2      (1)
where N is the number of fatally injured. In this case, the 
stated frequencies are not acceptable. However, this find-
ing is incompatible with the experience of and information 
about past accidents. Fatal injuries are rather rare, which 
is evident from papers [10, 14]. In addition, these fatali-
ties were caused, above all, by poisoning. The explanation 
may be the following:
• Movement of persons in objects of biogas plants is 
very sparse. 
• Physical properties of biogas differ from methane 
(e.g. explosive limits, ignition energy, etc.).
• The conditions for a biogas explosion are very spe-
cific (e.g. closed space).
5 Conclusion 
The resulting top event frequency f = 1.6 x 10-2 y-1 is 
approximately three orders of magnitude higher than the 
value given in the CPR 18 methodology for single-layer 
atmospheric vessels. The event frequencies (listed in this 
methodology) were established on the basis of a consensus 
among experts in the chemical technology, industry and 
the government administration authorities [31]. This meth-
odology is focused, above all, on the chemical industry. 
BEVI methodology was used for the determination of 
representative scenario frequency. The resulting values 
were high and the frequencies are not acceptable. This find-
ing is incompatible with operational experience and infor-
mation about past accidents. For QRA purposes, it seems 
appropriate to choose the value of event frequency lower. 
However, according to the author’s opinion, this value 
should not be lower than the event frequency value shown 
in CPR 18 for the single-containment atmospheric tank. 
In the case of biogas plants, the total gas leakage from 
the integrated gas holder will be positively affected by the 
fact that the membrane will be located a few metres above 
ground. Furthermore, biogas with an approximate compo-
sition of 60 %
vol
 methane and 40 %
vol
 carbon dioxide rather 
behaves as a neutral gas towards the surrounding atmo-
sphere. From this, it can be deduced that there is a lower 
probability of biogas ignition. The reason is that most of 
the sources of initiation (car with running engine, cogen-
eration unit, operator movement, etc.) are located on the 
ground. For accidents caused by strong wind, it is also pos-
sible to expect a rapid dilution of the flammable mixture 
by ambient air. In the case of windstorms, the risk of def-
lagration increases, when an event occurs that the air flows 
partly around the shifted membrane into the internal parts 
of the gas holder. In this way, an ignition mixture may be 
formed. The source of ignition may be, for example: the 
discharge of an electrical charge which can accumulate on 
different parts of the fermenter construction due to friction.
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